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Competition and Symmetry in an
Artificial Word Learning Task
Brian Buccola 1*†, Isabelle Dautriche 2† and Emmanuel Chemla 1
1 Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique (ENS, EHESS, CNRS), Département d’Études Cognitives, École
Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France, 2Centre for Language Evolution, University of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Natural language involves competition. The sentences we choose to utter activate
alternative sentences (those we chose not to utter), which hearers typically infer to be
false. Hence, as a first approximation, the more alternatives a sentence activates, the
more inferences it will trigger. But a closer look at the theory of competition shows
that this is not quite true and that under specific circumstances, so-called symmetric
alternatives cancel each other out. We present an artificial word learning experiment
in which participants learn words that may enter into competition with one another.
The results show that a mechanism of competition takes place, and that the subtle
prediction that alternatives trigger inferences, and may stop triggering them after a point
due to symmetry, is borne out. This study provides a minimal testing paradigm to reveal
competition and some of its subtle characteristics in human languages and beyond.
Keywords: competition, symmetry, alternatives, psycholinguistics, semantics, pragmatics
1. COMPETITION IN LANGUAGE
1.1. First Examples and Description
In using language to communicate, the words and phrases that a speaker decides to use nearly
always acquire an interpretation that goes beyond their strict, literal meaning. For example, if Alice
utters to Bob the sentence in (1), then Bob might infer, among other things, that the animal Alice
saw was not a cat or dog (or, at least, that Alice does not believe it was), but rather some more
unusual animal like a raccoon, even though cats and dogs obviously count as animals, too.
(1) I saw an animal on my neighbor’s porch this morning.
Similarly, if Alice utters to Bob the sentence in (2), then Bob will likely infer that Alice did not see
both a dog and a cat on her neighbor’s porch, even though, strictly speaking, seeing both animals
counts as an instance of seeing one or the other.
(2) I saw a cat or a dog on my neighbor’s porch this morning.
The process by which hearers draw these inferences has been the subject of much research and
debate in semantic and pragmatic theory. However, starting with the pioneering work of Grice
(1975), there is a consensus that, at its root, the process involves the hearer reasoning not just about
what the speaker said, but also what the speaker could have said but chose not to say. That is, the
things we say, as well as alternative things we could have said but chose not to, together affect the
overall meanings of our utterances. In the case of (1), for example, if Alice had in fact seen a dog
(and Alice knows she saw a dog), then it would be more appropriate for Alice to say so, even if
(1) is true. Thus, if Alice chooses to utter (1) rather than the minimally different (3), in which dog
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replaces animal, then it is reasonable to infer that she did so
because the animal she saw is not a dog (or any other option of
the sort worth mentioning).
(3) I saw a dog on my neighbor’s porch this morning.
In a parallel way, if Alice had seen both a cat and a dog (and
Alice knows she saw both), then it would be more appropriate for
Alice to say so, even if (2) is true. Thus, if Alice chooses to utter
(2) rather than the minimally different (4), in which and replaces
or, then it is reasonable to infer that she did so because she did
not see both a cat and a dog.
(4) I saw a cat and a dog on my neighbor’s porch this morning.
Grice (1975) coined the term implicature (and the associated
verb implicate) to refer to the act of implying one thing by saying
another. Thus, for instance, a speaker who utters (2) tends, we
say, to implicate that (4) is false.
In sum, then, as speakers, the various things we can say when
communicating a message “compete” with one another, so that
what we choose to say and what we choose not to say together
affect the final message we transmit.
1.2. Toward a Theory of Competition
As a first approximation toward a theory of competition in
language, we might say that the use of an expression ϕ licenses
the inference that ϕ was, in some sense, “better” or “more
appropriate” than every alternative of ϕ that could have been
used instead. We refer to this as the Competition Principle. (Our
formulation in (5) is more general than the sorts of formulations
found in the literature— e.g., Davis, 2014 and the references
therein—and our reason for this is so that we may apply it to
situations beyond traditional communicative settings.)
(5) Competition Principle. The use of ϕ implies that each
alternative ψ of ϕ is less appropriate than ϕ.
This principle presupposes several notions that need to be
spelled out: the notion of use, the notion of appropriateness, and
the notion of an alternative.
In the context of the examples of above, and indeed in most
of the relevant literature, to use an expression simply means to
utter it, broadly speaking (i.e., to vocalize it, to sign it, to write it,
and so on). In the context of our experimental task, this notion
will take on a slightly broader meaning, which we will discuss
later on.
The notion of appropriateness encompasses several possible
things, because alternatives may be inappropriate (or less
appropriate) for different reasons. For example, an alternative ψ
of ϕ may be inappropriate simply because ψ is false (while ϕ is
true), orψ may be inappropriate because, although true,ψ is less
informative, or specific, than ϕ. (This aspect of the Competition
Principle is traditionally grounded in Grice’s maxims of Quality
and Quantity, respectively. We collapse them here for the sake of
simplicity.)
Finally, the notion of alternative raises the question of what
exactly “counts” as an alternative of ϕ. This is an important
question that has received quite a bit of attention in the literature,
the consensus being that alternatives need to be constrained in
one way or another (for specific proposals, see, e.g., the Horn
scales of Horn, 1972, and the theory of structurally defined
alternatives of Katzir, 2007). We will not have much to add
to this debate. For concreteness, we will adopt the simplistic
view that the alternatives of ϕ are obtained by (recursively)
replacing lexical elements in ϕ with other lexical elements from
the given language. (For our experimental task, the choice of
theory is immaterial, roughly because it will involve single-word
expressions anyway.)
Putting everything together, we can say that, because of the
Competition Principle, an utterance of (1) licenses the inference
that the alternative in (3) is false (hence, that Alice saw an animal,
but not a dog), and an utterance of (2) licenses the inference that
the alternative in (4) is false (hence, that Alice saw a cat or a dog,
but not both).
1.3. Symmetry
We have seen that alternatives create inferences. From the
discussion so far, one may think that the more alternatives a
sentence has, the more inferences one will draw from the use
of that sentence. But this is not always so, because alternatives
may cancel each other out, when a certain logical relation,
known as symmetry, obtains between them (relative to the uttered
sentence).
Abstractly first, symmetry arises when a sentence ϕ has two
alternatives, ψ1 and ψ2, such that ψ1 and ψ2 can each be
individually negated without contradicting ϕ, but their combined
negation contradicts ϕ. In symbols, ϕ ∧ ¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2 is a
contradiction, while ϕ ∧ ¬ψ1 and ϕ ∧ ¬ψ2 are not. In such
cases, we say that ψ1 and ψ2 are symmetric alternatives (relative
to ϕ), and that they create symmetry, because they cannot both be
negated in a way that is compatible with ϕ—negating one forces
the other to be true (Fox, 2007).
Concretely now, let ϕ be (2), and suppose that its two
alternatives are (6a) (= ψ1) and (6b) (= ψ2) below. Then it
is not possible for both (6a) to be false (Alice did not see a
cat) and (6b) to be false (Alice did not see a dog), while at the
same time the original sentence is true (Alice saw one or the
other). So, disjunction (ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2) is a concrete case where
two alternatives (ψ1 and ψ2) cannot both be negated, hence are
symmetric.
(6) a. I saw a cat on my neighbor’s porch this morning.
b. I saw a dog on my neighbor’s porch this morning.
In cases of symmetry, one might expect that in some contexts,
ϕ could imply ¬ψ1 (rather than ¬ψ2), while in other contexts, ϕ
could imply ¬ψ2 (rather than ¬ψ1). In actual fact, however, we
observe that context cannot “break” symmetry (Fox and Katzir,
2011). Instead, hearers draw speaker uncertainty inferences
regarding symmetric alternatives.
For example, (2), in addition to conveying that Alice did not
see both a cat and a dog, also conveys that Alice is uncertain
which of the two animals (a cat or a dog) she actually saw.
How does the Competition Principle help us to understand this
uncertainty inference? If Alice utters (2), and if (6a) and (6b)
are alternatives of (2) (Sauerland, 2004), then the Competition
Principle us that each of them was less appropriate than (2).
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However, by “less appropriate,” we cannot mean false, because it
cannot be that (2) is true while (6a) and (6b) are both false (again,
that would be a contradiction). So, it must mean something else.
One natural possibility is that (2) is appropriate because Alice
is certain that it is true, whereas each of (6a) and (6b) is less
appropriate in virtue of Alice not being certain that it is true.
If so, then this amounts to the observed uncertainty inference
regarding the two symmetric alternatives (6a) and (6b).1
In short, more alternatives does not always equal more
inferences. Sometimes, more alternatives introduces symmetry,
which cancels out inferences that otherwise may have obtained
(or converts them from plain negated inferences to uncertainty
inferences).
1.4. Symmetry as a Diagnosis of
Competition
In actual language use, symmetry does not seem to appear or
disappear from context to context, but instead is rather stable
across contexts. Abstractly, a more informative alternative ψ
of ϕ either always has a symmetric partner (hence, the use of
ϕ yields speaker uncertainty about ψ), or never does (hence,
the use of ϕ yields the inference that ψ is false, provided
the speaker is competent about ψ , and ψ is relevant). For
example, when it comes to disjunction, as in (2), the conjunctive
alternative, (4), never has a symmetric partner— this would be
something like (7) below— so as a result, (2) invariably triggers
the inference that (4) is false, rather than speaker uncertainty
about (4) and (7).2 Conversely, a disjunction like (2) always has its
individual disjuncts, (6a) and (6b), as alternatives, hence always
exhibits symmetry, so as a result, (2) invariably triggers speaker
uncertainty about (6a) and (6b), rather than the inference that
one (or the other) of them is false.
(7) I saw a cat or a dog but not both on my neighbor’s porch this
morning.
A consequence of all this is that it can be relatively tricky
to observe competition directly. If ϕ typically implies ¬ψ , then
maybe this is simply because ϕ literally entails that ψ is false,
or because ψ is extremely unlikely to begin with (given ϕ). For
example, for (1), one might argue the inference that Alice did
not see a dog is simply a contextual one (it’s less likely for her
to have seen a dog than, say, a raccoon—a weak argument,
admittedly). Conversely, for (2), one might argue that or is
inherently exclusive, i.e., that ϕ or ψ literally means “ϕ or ψ but
not both”.
In a similar fashion, if ϕ typically implies speaker uncertainty
about ψ1 and ψ2, then maybe this is simply because ϕ
literally entails such uncertainty. For example, perhaps the literal
meaning of or encodes something about the knowledge state
1Sauerland (2004) (building on Gazdar, 1979; Soames, 1982; Horn, 1989) provides
a more formal implementation of this reasoning process.
2The question of why (4) but not (7) is an alternative of (2), and how the theory
of alternatives should explain this fact, is an instance of the so-called symmetry
problem (Fox, 2007; Katzir, 2007; Fox and Katzir, 2011), which does not concern
us here.
of the speaker who uses it, so that it actually entails speaker
uncertainty about the individual disjuncts.
In short, because competition is difficult to observe directly,
one may wonder whether there is any competition going
on in these cases to begin with. Of course, linguists have
developed intricate diagnostics to argue that these are examples
of competition, e.g., embedding them in downward-entailing
(roughly, negative) contexts and observing that the relevant
inferences disappear. For example, I did not see a cat or a dog
on my neighbor’s porch this morning does not trigger any speaker
uncertainty inferences, nor does it convey the denial of speaker
uncertainty about the individual disjuncts (if or literally encoded
speaker uncertainty, then this sentence could mean “it is not the
case that I saw a cat or a dog but I don’t know which,” which
would be true in a scenario where Alice saw a cat or a dog and
Alice knew which—an impossible reading of the sentence).
Nevertheless, our goal here is to explore whether there is a
way to observe the Competition Principle more directly. We
propose to do so using symmetry as the diagnosis for the presence
of competition, by manipulating the presence or absence of
symmetry across experimental contexts (something that does
not readily happen in everyday linguistic contexts). Specifically,
we report on an artificial word learning experiment which had
the following goal: to see whether we could create competition
between two nonce words—a word w that applies to more than
one kind of object, and a more specific/informative word w1 that
applies to a strict subset of what w applies to— and observe its
effect, and then to remove that effect by introducing a third word,
w2, such that w1 and w2 are symmetric relative to w.
Our artificial word learning experiment involved tasks
in which communicative cooperativeness (hence, traditional
Gricean maxims) seemed to play little or no role (there was
no speaker-hearer, for instance). Capitalizing on this aspect, a
secondary goal of ours was to see whether a general, i.e., not
specifically conversational, notion of competition— something
like our Competition Principle in (5)— could be detected,
especially since it is often assumed in the Gricean literature that
Gricean principles are grounded in more general principles of
rationality.3 Up to now, this idea has never been tested. Our
results suggest a positive answer: the Competition Principle does
play a role in non-conversational tasks like the ones we used.
2. EXPERIMENT
The Competition Principle seems to be at the heart of pragmatic
enrichment during communication in natural language, but it
can often be difficult to assess exactly what is in competition, what
role symmetry plays, etc. We present an experimental study that
investigates whether we may observe the Competition Principle
somewhat more directly over the course of acquisition of nonce
words, by manipulating the presence or absence of alternatives
and symmetry across experimental contexts.
3The idea that conversation is a cooperative enterprise grounded in rational
behavior originates with Grice himself (Grice, 1975) (for discussion, see also
Levinson, 1983). Recent game-theoretic approaches to this idea include Franke
(2011) and Bergen et al. (2016).
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2.1. Task Summary and Hypothesis
The goal of the task was to learn three new words—w, w1, and
w2—where w applied to (at least) two kinds of objects (e.g., both
triangles and circles), whilew1 applied to just one of the two kinds
(e.g., triangles), and w2 applied to just the other of the two kinds
(e.g., circles) (see Figure 1).
To learn the meaning of words, participants observed a series
of displays containing one of the words to be learned and a
collection of objects with different properties (see Figure 2). They
then picked an object from the collection and received feedback.
We tested participants’ understanding of w when presented
with both w1-type-objects and w2-type-objects at different
learning stages: after they learned w only, after they learned
w and w1 but not w2, and after they learned all three words
w, w1, and w2 (see Figure 3). The idea then was to gradually
introduce alternatives: first a unique alternative, which may
trigger inferences through the Competition Principle, and then
yet another alternative that may create symmetry, and could
therefore remove the inferential effect of competition. More
specifically, our hypothesis was the following: after learning
w, but before learning w1 or w2, participants should choose
indiscriminately between the two kinds of objects (or perhaps
with some measurable bias); after learning w and w1, participants
should choose w2-type-objects more so than before, due to
competition between w and w1; and finally after learning w, w1,
andw2, participants should go back to choosing indiscriminately,
due to symmetry between w1 and w2.
2.2. Method
All data and scripts for their analysis are available at https://
semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DJmNjYxY/.
2.2.1. Ethics Statement
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Comité d’Éthique de la Recherche
en Santé (2013/46). The protocol was approved by the Comité
FIGURE 1 | Participants learned four novel words: three critical words (w, w1,
and w2) and one control word (wc). w applied to (at least) two kinds of objects
(e.g., both triangles and circles), while w1 applied to just one of the two kinds
(e.g., triangles), and w2 applied to just the other of the two kinds (e.g., circles).
d’Éthique de la Recherche en Santé (2013/46). In accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki, prior to participating in this
online study, all participants were presented with the informed
consent document and instructions stating that by clicking
“I accept” they indicated their consent to participate in the study.
2.2.2. Participants
Fifty-three adults were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (25 females; M = 38 years; all native speakers of English)
and compensated $1.80 for their participation. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two groups (see Design below): the
Competition group (N = 26) and the No-competition group
(N = 27). One additional participant was excluded in the
Competition group for failing to pass the learning criteria.
2.2.3. Procedure
Participants were tested online. They were instructed that their
task was to learn new words by associating them with objects
displayed on the screen. In the instructions, participants were
given a screenshot of a trial involving a word (not used during the
test) and a set of objects. No information about the number of to-
be-learned words was given. For each trial, a word was displayed,
first alone for 500ms to attract participants’ attention to the word,
then together with a collection of 3 objects, aligned horizontally,
below the word (see Figure 2). Participants were asked to click
on the object they believed to be associated with the word. The
experiment consisted of several learning and testing phases (see
Design below).
During the learning phases, participants received feedback on
their response after each trial. The feedback was displayed in
a horizontal bar positioned at the top of the screen. The bar
turned green and displayed the prompt “Correct!” for correct
responses, and turned red and displayed the prompt “Incorrect”
for incorrect responses. Correct responses had 2 s of feedback
before the next trial, while incorrect responses had 6 s of feedback
to increase attention to the task.
During the testing phases, participants did not receive any
feedback: once they responded, the experiment continued with
the next trial. Each testing phase was preceded by a warning to
participants (“You will not receive feedback for the next couple
of events.”) displayed for 4 s in the same top horizontal bar used
for the feedback.
Participants’ answers as well as their response times were
recorded on each trial. At the end of the experiment, there was
FIGURE 2 | Example of a trial.
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FIGURE 3 | Experimental design, conditions, and predictions. Participants were administered a sequence of learning and testing phases. The Competition group was
administered the 3 learning phases (followed by their testing phases), as they learned w, w1, and w2 sequentially. The No-competition group skipped the second
learning phase ({w,w1}), as w1 and w2 were learned simultaneously. The testing phase, following each learning phase, consisted of the same critical trials: participants
were presented with the word w and both w1-type-objects and w2-type-objects. We predicted that after learning w only, there should be no preference in choosing
between w1-type-objects vs. w2-type-objects. Critically, we predicted that after introducing a single alternative (after learning w and w1 but not w2), w1-type-objects
should be selected less than before, due to competition between w and w1. Finally, introducing a second alternative (or learning both alternatives simultaneously in
the case of the No-competition group) should remove the effect of competition; thus, we expect no preference between w1-type-objects and w2-type-objects.
a final questionnaire asking participants about their age, native
language, and country.
2.2.4. Stimuli
The space of objects included 3 geometric shapes (circles,
triangles, and squares) and 3 organic shapes (clouds of dots,
clouds of curly lines, and spiraling branches). For variability,
objects also varied across two irrelevant dimensions: colors (red,
yellow, blue, green, and pink) and size (small, medium, and big),
leading to 15 possible configurations per object.
We chose 4 novel words from a list of pseudowords obeying
the rules of English phonotactics (blicket, dax, diti, smick, tupa,
fep, bosa,moop, zud, vash, and gaddle).
2.2.5. Design
Each participant learned four words over the course of the
experiment: w, w1, w2, and wc. w applied to the 3 geometrical
shapes (i.e., circles, triangles, and squares), whereas w1 applied
to just one (e.g., triangles), and w2 to another one (e.g., circles)
(see Figure 1). wc was a control word that applied to one
of the 3 organic shapes to encourage participants to pay
attention to the words and not click systematically on any
of the geometrical shapes present in the display. The target
objects associated with w1, w2, and wc were randomized across
participants.
The experiment was divided into several learning phases, each
followed by a testing phase. We used a between-subject design in
which some subjects received three learning and testing phases
(the Competition group), and others two (the No-competition
group). In the former case, participants first learned w and
wc, then w1, and finally w2; in the latter case, participants
first learned w and wc, then w1 and w2 simultaneously (see
Figure 3 for a graphical illustration of the time course of the
experiment).
2.2.6. Learning Phases
All trials featured a single target object with two randomly chosen
distractors such that there was only a single correct response.
Trials were presented in blocks to control for the amount of
learning received for each word. Details describing the exact
number of trials per word per block in each learning phase
can be found in the Supplemental Material. Participants were
exposed to a minimum of 3 blocks. The learning phase ended
when participants responded correctly for all trials in a block. If
they answered more than 250 trials without reaching the learning
criteria, the experiment continued normally but we discarded
their responses (N = 1).
2.2.7. Testing Phases
The testing phases always consisted of 4 critical trials interspaced
with the same type of trials seen during the previous learning
phase (3 trials per word learned until that point; see the
Supplemental Material for a precise description). In the critical
trials, participants were presented with w, together with a
collection of objects that contained both a w1-type-object (e.g., a
triangle) and a w2-type-object (e.g., a circle). These critical
trials were placed at the beginning of the testing phases, and
interspaced by one other trial.
2.2.8. Conditions and Predictions
There were three conditions that depended on the training
a participant received. In the {w} condition (no alternative),
participants had learned w but not w1 or w2; in the {w,w1}
condition (one alternative), participants had learned both w and
w1 but not w2; and in the {w,w1,w2} condition (two alternatives,
symmetric), participants had learned w, w1, and w2.
The testing phase, with the same critical trials, was
administered after each of these different learning phases,
allowing us to test the effect of symmetry in participants’
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lexicon on their responses on the critical trials. We measured
the proportion of w1-type-objects vs. w2-type-objects that
participants picked when presented with the word w and both
kinds of objects. The critical trials and the predictions associated
with each condition are illustrated in Figure 3. Our predictions
were the following: in the {w} condition (after learning w,
but before learning w1 or w2), participants should choose
indiscriminately between the two kinds (or perhaps with some
measurable bias); in the {w,w1} condition (after learning w and
w1, but before learning w2), participants should choose w2-type-
objects more so than before, due to competition between w
and w1; and in the {w,w1,w2} condition (after learning w, w1,
and w2), participants should go back to the same response rate
observed in the {w} condition, due to symmetry between w1
and w2. Critically, in the No-competition group, who are not
learning w1 and w2 sequentially but simultaneously (and thus do
not receive the {w,w1} condition), there should be no difference
in their response rate between the {w} and the {w,w1,w2}
conditions, since both w1 and w2 immediately compete with
w, and the effects of competition are thus canceled out due to
symmetry.
2.2.9. Data Analysis
The data analysis was conducted using the lme4 package (Bates
et al., 2015) of R. In a mixed logit regression (Jaeger, 2008),
we modeled the selection of w1-type-objects (coded as 0 or 1)
compared to w2-type-objects during the critical test trials. All
responses on critical trials were included in the analysis since
participants always picked either w1- or w2-type-objects, and
never a distractor object. The model included two categorical
predictors with their interaction: Group (Competition vs.
No-Competition) and Condition ({w} vs. {w,w1} vs. {w,w1,w2})
as well as a random intercept and random slopes for Condition
for participants. The resulting R syntax for the model was:
w1-type-objects-selection ~ Condition *
Group + (1 + Condition | Participant).
2.3. Results
Figure 4 reports the average proportion of w1-type-object
responses during the critical trials by condition ({w} vs. {w,w1}
vs. {w,w1,w2}) and group (Competition vs. No-Competition).
The outputs of the models are in the Supplemental Material,
with the full script available at https://semanticsarchive.
net/Archive/DJmNjYxY/Competition_analysis.R. Over the
conditions present in the two groups ({w} and {w,w1,w2}),
there was no main effect of Group (χ2 = 0.27; p = 0.87),
nor a significant interaction between Condition and Group
(χ2 = 0.01; p = 0.91), illustrating that both groups responded in
the same way in the {w} condition (Mcomp = 0.46; SEcomp = 0.06
vs. Mno−comp = 0.49; SEno−comp = 0.07) and in the {w,w1,w2}
condition (Mcomp = 0.49; SEcomp = 0.08 vs. Mno−comp = 0.52;
SEno−comp = 0.08).
Critically, there was a main effect of Condition (χ2 = 13.61;
p < 0.01). Participants’ responses were sensitive to the presence
or the absence of symmetry in their lexicon: participants in the
Competition group selected less w1-type-objects in the {w,w1}
(M = 0.27; SE = 0.07) condition than in the surrounding {w}
FIGURE 4 | Proportion of w1-type-object responses obtained during the
critical trials for each condition (relevant words learned were {w} vs. {w,w1}
vs. {w,w1,w2}) and for each group (Competition vs. No-Competition). Error
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
(β = 1.72; z = 2.66; p < 0.01) and {w,w1,w2} (β = 1.82;
z = 2.86; p < 0.01) conditions. In other words, learning w1
created visible effects of competition, and further learning its
symmetric alternative, w2, removed these effects.
2.4. Discussion
Participants were sensitive to the presence/absence of alternatives
and symmetry in their lexicon: when asked to pick an object
corresponding to a word w, participants preferred to pick a
w-compatible object for which there was no alternative word
that also applied, i.e., to pick a w2-type-object (for which there
was no alternative word yet) rather than a w1-type-object (for
which there was an alternative word, w1). This competition
effect between the referents of the word w—those that were
w1-compatible and those that were not—was removed when
participants learned another alternative word, w2, that applied
to just the other kind of objects labeled by w, due to symmetry
between w1 and w2.
Our task involved nonce words that have translation
equivalents in the English lexicon (e.g., shape, triangle, circle).
Can our result be explained by participants’ existing lexicon?
We believe it is unlikely. If participants used their existing
lexicon in the task, then we would expect no competition in the
{w,w1} condition, as the English lexicon would still be symmetric
in this case. Therefore, the presence of a competition effect,
and its subsequent removal after introducing w2, suggest that
participants use only their newly acquired lexicon in the task.
Another possible alternative explanation for the effect is that
participants answered strategically with the goal of balancing out
their w1-type (e.g., triangle) and w2-type (e.g., circle) responses.
As a result, when they had a choice between triangle and circle,
if they had responded triangles often enough, they may have
decided to pick the circle. When learning an alternative word
during a learning phase, participants were given opportunities
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to respond with the shape corresponding to that word, and
so in the following testing phase, they may have thus seized
opportunities to give the other options. This explanation predicts
that the symmetry effect should be mitigated by this behavior,
since the third learning phase does not completely erase the
imbalance between the two alternatives (triangles have been
selected more often than circles across all learning phases).
Yet this is not what we observe. Also, although it is phrased
differently, this description may actually be just another version
of the Competition Principle: the reason why participants want
to balance their triangle and circle responses, all things being
equal, may very well be because of a competition effect (selecting
triangles repetitively when prompted with the alternative word,
w1, would encourage participants to pick circles over triangles
when prompted with a compatible word, w). All in all, however,
after debriefing a few people who did the tasks in our lab, it
seems that the direct competition explanation is a better match
for explaining our participants’ behavior.
Finally, an anonymous colleague (p.c.) notes that in testing
phase 3, perhaps participants construe w as referring to the third,
w3-type-object (via competition between w and both w1 and
w2), and are at chance only because the w3-type-object is not an
available option on the critical test trials, not because symmetry
is at play, as we claim. To spell this idea out a bit more explicitly,
once w1 and w2 are both learned, then in the critical trial, if
competition were at play, then participants would construe w
as “w but not w1 and not w2,” i.e., as w3; but since w3 is not
an available option, the overall result is a kind of “contextual
contradiction.” As such, competition leads to a crash, and so
competition evidently must not be at play (is “turned off”), and
so participants choose randomly between w1 and w2, just like
in phase 1. If this is correct, then one could still present this
situation as a case of symmetry blocking inferences: w1 and w2
are symmetric relative to w and the context of the trial (which
excludes w3 as an option), and that is why participants do not
invariably go for just one or the other. Put differently, w1 and
w2 are still symmetric relative to w in the context of the trial,
in the sense that “w and not w1 and not w2” is a contextual
contradiction given the absence of any w3-type-object. (In other
cases of symmetry, “w and not w1 and not w2” would be a plain
contradiction, as discussed in §1.3 for the case of disjunction,
ϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2.) So, here, contextual symmetry blocks inferences,
just as in other cases of symmetry.
In sum, our results suggest that the Competition Principle
may be observed directly during an artificial word learning task
as a function of the absence or presence of symmetry at different
learning stages of an artificial lexicon.
3. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that competition (with and without
symmetry) arises spontaneously in artificial word learning tasks,
even though the experimental context is not a traditional
conversational exchange in any obvious sense. This in turnmeans
that participants appear to apply something like the Competition
Principle during the task. Specifically, they presumably apply a
kind of reasoning like the following:
• {w} condition: No competition. Choose freely between the
w1-type-object and the w2-type-object.
• {w,w1} condition: The trial uses w, but it could have used
w1 instead. Therefore, w1 might have been less appropriate.
Thus, the w1-type-object might be less appropriate than the
w2-type-object. Choose the w2-type-object.
• {w,w1,w2} condition: The trial uses w, but it could have used
w1 or w2. Therefore, w1 and w2 might have each been less
appropriate. But it would not follow that the w1-type-object is
less appropriate than the w2-type-object, or vice versa. Thus,
neither is more or less appropriate than the other. Choose
freely between them.
3.1. The Minimal Ingredients for
Competition
It is worth stressing that our experimental task involves the
absolute minimal ingredients required for observing competition
in all of its intricacy, including the role played by symmetry
(there are just three words:w,w1, andw2). That these ingredients
turn out to also be sufficient is remarkable, particularly in an
experimental context that bears little resemblance to everyday
conversational contexts (there is no speaker-hearer, for example).
Our results therefore suggest that, when even the minimal
ingredients for competition are present, humans instinctively and
spontaneously employ something like the Competition Principle.
3.2. Beyond Human Reasoning
Non-human animals, such as monkeys, dogs, and birds, are
capable of learning words, and they are also capable of applying
strategic reasoning in various tasks. It has even been suggested
that some monkeys apply a kind of Competition Principle in
their natural alarm call system (Schlenker et al., 2014, 2016).
A natural question is whether we can directly detect the
Competition Principle at play in non-human animal behavior.
Our experimental design is sufficiently simple that it should be
straightforward to examine this question, something we hope to
do in future work.
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